In this case study, we propose a model to foster and sustain innovation in a large corporation. Despite the successful business track record that large corporations invariably show, their sheer size sometimes hinders their ability to respond rapidly to changes in technology, market, and consumer preference. It also affects their ability to innovate consistently. Our model builds on recent theoretical advances in the understanding of the innovation process, placing a strong emphasis on the need for people to interact across business units. We also defend the need for a formal recognition of the people involved in transferring technology from the ''concept'' stage to the ''commercial application'' phase. Significant parts of our argument are based on the experience of one of the authors in a large corporation. We begin the paper with an assessment of current perspectives on the innovation process, identifying the lack of a descriptive or normative model that can guide large corporations in the improvement of their innovation performance. Building on the experience of a specific project developed at 3M, which incorporates organizational novelties aimed at improving the process of technology transfer, we conclude with a new model to foster innovation in a large corporation. q
Introduction
The creation and development of new firms is universally welcomed. New ideas and new market preferences provide the main ingredients which, mixed with the existence of an entrepreneurial spirit and the right contextual environment, produce the incentives and the opportunities for the establishment of new businesses. New businesses, in turn, contribute to an overall process of sustained economic development. However, this process is often a deadly blow from the point of view of established companies. Ž . Schumpeter 1911 described this process of economic development as one of ''creative destruction. '' Large companies seem to be particularly vulnerable to this type of creative destruc-Ž . tion by newcomers. In a recent article, Hannah 1998 notes that the largest company in the world in 1912 was US Steel. Of the 100 largest global corporations of the time, only about 20 are still part of the list of the 100 biggest. The companies surviving in the list Ž are associated with industries that grew during the 20th century: petroleum Exxon and . Ž . Ž . BP, for example , electricity General Electric , chemistry BASF , branded consump-Ž . tion products Unilever and Procter and Gamble .
Therefore, it is not hard to understand the concern of today's large corporation not to Ž . be creatively destroyed or surpassed by new ideas and new markets. The still relatively new software industry, for example, contributes today to 8% of American GDP, and it is Ž . responsible for one quarter of its annual growth The Economist, 1998 . The US, by the way, seems to be a country in which fiercely competitive markets, a strong entrepreneurial spirit, and a tradition of innovation make the process of creative destruction Ž . particularly ruthless. Still according to Hannah 1998 , of the companies that are today part of the 100 global giants, 75% of the Britain and 66% of the German were already in the list in 1912. However, only 26% of the US companies were able to maintain a position in the 100 industrial leaders from 1912 until today.
Naturally, corporations become large because growth is a consequence of their success. While there are few large corporations such as Lucent Technologies, Imation Ž and others that were large companies from the beginning basically because they were . spin-offs , most companies grow from small-group beginnings. In most cases, resources, product lines, markets and the customer base grow as derivatives of success.
However, there are characteristics of drive, focus, and innovation ability that are often lost with size, leading often to the destruction of large, complacent firms. Despite the fact that in companies large and small a prevalent problem is that groups do not know what other groups are doing; large companies, with heavy structures, internal regulations, and deep bureaucracy, are more prone to suffer from such communication problems.
1 While this is not something particularly catastrophic, it promotes a lack of or slow-down in technology transfer and innovation. In technology-based companies, this unawareness of activities across groups leads to missed opportunities, and this unawareness is increasingly more frequent as a company's size grows. Further breakdown in technology transfer and even more missed opportunities are typical of large or multi-national corporations and of corporations whose product or services are highly diverse.
1 Several claims and observations, such as this, result from the industrial experience of one of the authors. Therefore, they are more a matter of perception and experience, than of rigorously proven scholarship. The value of this paper is precisely in the meshing of the practical with the theoretical perspective. Therefore, when these types of claims are not formally referenced it is implicit that they result from the pragmatic experience of one of the authors. ) This paper aims to propose a model of technology transfer within the context of a large corporation that reduces the problems described above. This technology transfer model, if practiced, would expedite the diffusion of innovation within a company, promote better use of existing intellectual property, enhance new and innovative ways to employ existing internal and external technologies and expedite the internal intellectual property into capital creating products in the market place.
Following this introduction, Section 2 provides an overview of conceptual models of innovation. Section 3 describes current practices at 3M as the focus of our case study. Section 4 develops our proposed model. Finally, Section 5 briefly summarizes our conclusions.
Creativity and innovation
We will begin by defining some important concepts, namely, technology and innovation. There are several different understandings of what technology is, from the identification of technology with new machines and plants, to the identification of technology mainly with intangible aspects, like knowledge. We will adopt a formal Ž definition that has been the result of the conceptual effort of OECD Organization for . Ž . Economic Co-operation and Development 1994 :
Technology encompasses the scientific and empirical knowledge that can be directly applied to the production, improvement or utilization of goods and services.
Ž .

Still according to the OECD 1992 :
A technological innovation corresponds to the introduction of new products and processes in the market or to a significant change in existing products and processes.
It is important to note that an innovation only exists when it has acquired economic relevance. In fact, creativity may be thought of as having the ability or power to be imaginative, novel, original, andror expressive. Although an innovation requires creativity, it is more related to the capital creation and problem solving potential that might be derived from creativity. This is what differentiates an innovation from an invention, since the latter may exist without any impact in the market place. A further important Ž . concept is diffusion, which OECD 1988 defines as:
. . . an increasing adoption by other users as well as more extensive use by the original innovator of a specific innovation. More generally, it encompasses all those actions at the level of the firm or organization taken to exploit the economic benefits of the innovation.
In other words, innovation can be thought of as ''the successful production, assimilaw x tion and exploitation of novelty in the economic and social spheres offering new w x solutions to problems and thus making it possible to meet the needs of both the Ž . individual and society'' European Commission, 1995 . Since perhaps the biggest need of business organizations is to make a profit, it is evident that businesses must be innovative in order to survive. There have been several different conceptual understandings on the functioning of the innovation process. These conceptual constructs are relevant because, often, they are the basis of policy and management decisions. In fact, our aim in this paper is precisely to develop a new model that, hopefully, will influence and improve upon management practices. The short overview that ensues is an attempt to summarize the most important theories of innovation in a historical perspective, indicating what we have learned about effective innovation practices. Ž . Schumpeter 1911 presented an understanding of economic development on creative destruction, as we saw in the introduction. Schumpeter conceptualized as being created Ž by entrepreneurs, which pick-up inventions ideas that have not been tried commercially . before from an existing knowledge pool, and is able to introduce those ideas into economic life creating innovations.
Three main ideas come from Schumpeter's theory:
Ž . 1. inventive activity is entirely exogenous external to the economy, that is, inventions are grasped by entrepreneurs that figure out how to make money, through inventions, with these new discoveries; 2. technological innovations lead to economic development, through the new products and processes that are introduced by the entrepreneurs; 3. the innovation process is linear, beginning with inventions, and ending with innovations, where monetary profits are to be made.
These three ideas led to the conceptual scheme at the heart of the linear model of innoÕation: exogenous technological innoÕation pushes economic growth. Towards the middle of the 20th century inventions became increasingly dependent on organized R & D. In fact, the genius inventor that we are accustomed to glorify in the person of Ž . Edison, and others like Goodyear became increasingly a myth. Schumpeter realized that inventions were increasingly the result of purposefully and systematic R & D efforts. This leads to the following general conceptual scheme for the process of innovation: research and development lead to inventions, which yield technological innovation, Ž . contributing to economic growth Fig. 1 .
Ž . This linear view had policy implications. Bush 1945 , capitalizing on the scientific contribution to the victory in WW2, pushed for a strong government support for R & D Ž . based on a rhetorical argument to expand the frontier of knowledge and on three pragmatic considerations: end disease, assuring national security, and economic growth. To create more jobs we must take new and better and cheaper products. We want plenty of new, vigorous enterprises. But new products are not born full-grown. They are founded on new principles and new conception, which in turn result from basic scientific research. Ž Until the mid 1960s, the view that technology comes down from Heaven or raises . from Hell, depending on the perspective into the economy was well-established. It seemed that all major breakthroughs in scientific and technological advances came from universities, research laboratories, and government agencies such as NASA. Government expenditures on R & D increased at a 10% average annual rate from 1953 to 1967, and Ž . private expenditures at a 7.5% rate constant prices . Global expenditures on R & D as a fraction of GDP more than doubled in the same period, from 1.4% to close to 3% Ž . Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989 . The two major policy implications of the exogenous technology paradigm were:
Ø the huge public expenditure, and its rate of growth, as we saw; Ø the divisionrfragmentation of policy into isolated areas, such as policy for basic science, a policy for technology transfer, a policy for industrial innovation, and so on.
This understanding of science and technological change as an exogenous engine of Ž . growth is embodied in the neoclassical growth theory of Solow 1956 Solow , 1957 . Solow's Ž . aim was to distinguish the effects on growth of increasing inputs capital and labor from the impact of exogenous technological change. Solow starts with pure neoclassical Ž assumptions: capital K, meaning machines, industrial equipment, infrastructures, mea-. Ž sured in dollars and labor L, meaning people, the labor force, also measured in dollars, . through a wage rate constitute the inputs that firms transform, through a technology Ž Ž .. Ž represented by a production function F P , into outputs Y, representing the goods and . services available in the market place ; inputs and outputs are exchanged between firms and households in purely competitive markets where relative equilibrium prices are determined by supply and demand clearing; 2 firms maximize profits and households utility. An aggregation of the economy's production functions and inputs and outputs leads to the economy's production function:
The assumptions of the neoclassical production function entail that a steady state rate of growth is attained, due to the hypothesis of diminishing returns.
4 At this equilibrium, 2 The price of the input ''labor'' is the wage rate, and the price of the input ''capital'' is the interest rate. 3 This aggregate production function requires some additional properties, namely constant returns to scale, positive, but diminishing, marginal returns to each of the inputs, and asymptotic and zero-limit properties known as the Inadda conditions. All these properties define a production function that has decreasing marginal returns to scale and defines convex set of possible techniques of production. 4 Diminishing returns is a popular concept in economics. In this context, it says that as we increase inputs Ž . say, labor force in an economy , output also increases but proportionally less and less, as our input increases more and more. Solow's model became very popular among economists. Derived from a simple mathematical formulation, it was able to yield several testable predictions. It came to embody the neoclassical stance on the dominant paradigm of exogenous technological change. Solow, on his Nobel Prize lecture in 1987, said that his work ''started a small industry,'' leading to ''hundreds of theoretical and empirical articles by other economists'' and becoming very quickly part of textbooks and of the fund of common knowledge of the profession. However, Solow was not interested in the process through which technological change occurs, but merely in the modeling of economic growth. For insights on the innovation process, we have to look to other authors outside the realm of pure economic theory.
Ž . The work of Schmookler 1966 is one of the most important pieces. This work challenged the Schumpeterian approach, the linear technology push model. Schmookler, studying the relationship between patents and demand in the railroad industry, found evidence that upswings in inventive activity responded to upswings in demand. This inverted the causal direction implicit in the exogenous technology paradigm: demand forces from within the economy pulled inÕentions and innoÕations. A major methodological difference of Schmookler's study was that it was not macroeconomic, but rather within the tradition of industrial organization. Instead of looking at the aggregate economy Schmookler, looking at a specific industry, found eÕidence that contradicted the implicit assumptions of the technology push model.
Other social and economic events led to an upsurge of studies during the late 1960s and 1970s that :
1. presented evidence in favor of demand pull hypothesis of Schmookler; Coombs et al.
Ž . 1987 present and discuss 12 such studies; 2. presented facts not explainable or not expected by the exogenous technology push model.
Some well-known facts not expected by the exogenous technology paradigm illustrate the lack of political confidence, besides scientific, in the existing paradigm. The inability Ž of science to meet the expectations of Nixon's War on Cancer the equivalent of . Kennedy's Man on the Moon and the failure of launching the supersonic transportation Ž . in the US to counter the Anglo-French Concorde are illustrative examples. Moreover, despite continuing innovations and scientific breakthroughs, during the 1970s the American economy was slowing down, unemployment and inflation both raising.
These anomalies could not be accounted for in the context of the Schumpeterian model, and new and widely divergent theories emerged. Besides the demand pull alternative, other theories include: the evolutionary approach of Nelson and Winter Ž . Ž . 1982 ; the historical analysis of Rosenberg 1972 ; the continuation of Schmookler's Ž . tradition in microapproaches of Freeman 1979 . These and other studies showed that ( )the process of innovation was much more complex than previously thought. Most of the Ž theories that emerged during this period, though, tried to explain some anomalies the . demand pull hypothesis could be understood as on conjecture of this type , but a deep redefinition of concepts, providing a new way of looking at the world, was needed.
In the mid 1980s, a new conceptual scheme, outdating the exogenous technology paradigm, emerged. More than merely solving anomalies, these ideas provided a radically new way of interpreting technological innovation. The basic ideas are: Ž . 1. technological change is endogenous to the economy not exogenous ; 2. innovation is a complex process where firms, the government, and several institutions Ž . interact not a linear one-way model, whether demand pull, or technology push .
This new concept of endogenous innovation incorporates a range of ideas that proved extremely useful in constructing new theories, including a more thorough analysis of innovation externalities; the lock-in phenomenon, popularized by the analysis of David Ž . 1986 of the evolution of the QWERTY keyboard; the acknowledgment that innovation Ž results are not purely public goods that is, technology is not like a radio wave, freely . accessible to any firm .
This new conceptual scheme is partially based on Schumpeter's later vision, expressed in 1943, where he added a subtle assumption: innovation is not captured by the entrepreneur outside the economy, but is rather the result of purposeful action by Ž . oligopolistic firms that haÕe the resources to deÕelop R & D Schumpeter, 1943 . The fundamental new idea is that technological innovation is endogenous to the economy.
Perhaps the most useful and acknowledged model in this new vein of endogenous and complex innovation is the Kline-Rosenberg interactive model of innovation. This model of innovation displaced the early linear models. This is an interactive model of innovation, meaning that there are complex links and feedback relationships between Ž . firms where the innovation takes place , and the science and technology system. In this interactive model, also called the chain-link model of innovation, innoÕation determines and is determined by the market and R & D is an essential set of activities to build a knowledge base.
This understanding of innovation, although centered on the firm, puts a strong emphasis on the enÕironmental context in which firms operate. To achieve successful innovations, the environment counts. The accent is shifted from the linear logic, where innovation is a singularity, to a philosophy of a social and economic process that underlies economically oriented technical noÕelty. Therefore, the social absorption capacity of new technologies in an economy has a central role. This absorption Ž . capability is associated with human capital a point made by Nelson and Phelps, 1966 , the institutional framework that builds the national innovation system, the existing Ž . knowledge base in part, a function of basic R & D , previous training by firms and institutions in innovative activities, among other factors.
The interactive model also tells us that innoÕation may occur at any of the stages represented in the central chain of innoÕation. An innovation can occur in distribution, Ž . as it can in the introduction of a new design the traditional sense, in some way . Dell Computer, for example, owes its success more to a ''distribution innovation'' than to the introduction of new products. . or vice-versa depends on the flavor ''technology push'' or ''demand pull,'' but we get, nonetheless, a linear model. We loose all the richness and detail conveyed by the interactive model.
A few more models of innovation, in the vein of endogenous technological change, Ž . should be referenced. Freeman 1988 focused on the importance of the national innovation systems that he describes as:
The network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies.
A strong national system of innovation allows for technological progress and economic prosperity. Freeman has summarized this point in the following quote:
The rate of technical change in any country and the effectiveness of companies in world competition in international trade in goods and services do not depend simply on the scale of their R & D and other technical activities. It depends upon the way in which the available resources are managed and organized, both at the enterprise and at the national level. The national system of innovation may enable a country with rather limited resources, nevertheless, to make very rapid progress through appropriate combination s of imported technology and local adaptation and development. On the other hand, weaknesses in the national systems of innovation may lead to more abundant resources being squandered by the pursuit of inappropriate objectives or the use of ineffective methods.
It is easy to perceive that Freeman's approach is very similar to Rosenberg's. Technological development is a function not only of the science system, depending on the broader concept of national innovation system and its institutional, human, organizational and financial aspects. Another major contribution of Freeman, more theoretical in character, is linked to the dynamics by which technological change affects economic development. As we have seen, an innovation corresponds to the introduction of a new product or process, or the improvement of an existing one, by a particular firm. Freeman generalized this concept to the national level, making an analogy between innovation at the firm level and a change in the techno-economic paradigm at the country level.
Ž . Originally, Dosi 1988 proposed this treatment, but Freeman has been the person most responsible for the popularization of this approach. A new techno-economic paradigm is, Ž . according to Freeman 1988 , w x . . . a combination of interrelated product and process, technical, organizational, and managerial innovations, permitting a quantum jump in potential productivity for all or most of the economy and opening an unusually wide range of new investment and profit opportunities.
This macroeconomic definition of innovation corresponds to what is, at the firm level, a radical innovation. Under this extreme, there are milder types of innovation, like incremental innovations, that correspond, at the microlevel, to improvements in existing ( )products and processes. Freeman builds a similar hierarchy for his macroanalysis of innovation, leading to a conceptual framework that has some similarity to the evolutionary economics of Nelson and Winter, to which we now turn.
The implications of the new understanding of innovation tend to push for a stronger integration of functions across a company. Attention must be given to a host of factors: basic research is important, but hardly crucial or even necessary for innovation; communication is key; coordination and integration of decision units are a requirement. The model we propose towards the end of this paper builds upon these insights, combined with the real-life experience of the innovation process in a large corporation. The case of 3M is described in the next section.
Innovation processes at 3M
3M makes a good supporting example for this discussion. 3M is a company with over 60,000 products. In fact, it is one of only a few fortune 50 companies that consistently maintain a ratio of nearly one product per employee. Thus, 3M would be considered a highly innovative company, able to draw on its technical knowledge base to produce capital-producing products for the benefit of its shareholders as well as for the benefit of society.
While the success of 3M is based in part to its culture of innovation, creativity and growth, a lot of it can be attributed to its diversity. Unlike companies such as Dell, Amoco, or Ford, 3M has penetrated many different markets. In order to produce products in different or independent markets, 3M has diversified its technical staff to include scientists, medical doctors, mechanical engineers, optical physicists, computer programmers, statisticians, etc. In companies with such diversity in technical employee profiles, there also exists a diversity of organizations at the divisional level. Within divisions, there often exist groups working in different products, in research, in design, etc. Additionally, some functional groups in a large global company such as 3M may be co-located away from headquarters. The multiplicity of corporate stratification creates group isolation and also bureaucratic systems that hamper quick knowledge diffusion. Thus, if an improvement method for the commercialization and technology transfer can be identified for an already innovative and successful enterprise such as 3M, it may follow that such a model is promising for many organizations.
In some areas, large companies, such as 3M, have a difficult time competing precisely because they cannot react to market trends, technological advances, customer requests or competitor moves as quickly as smaller competitors can. This is the paradox many large corporations face: How to leverage their resource advantage while acting as quickly, efficiently and effectively as more nimble and specialized, newer, and smaller organizations.
Large companies tend to maintain highly focused technical groups. At the level of these focused groups, the capital creation aspect of the technology transfer tends to erode at least partially, and an understanding of developments in other groups within the organization is often missing. The aggregate of these two elements compounded with isolationism from non-technical groups including marketing, planning, sales and upper ( )management is typical in large organizations. This combination tends to create a gap in the technology transfer process. 3M, a successful and innovative organization, is no exception.
One way for large organizations to act more nimble and deal better with the paradox of being large is to incorporate a better technology transfer methodology. In the 3M model, a number of technical interest groups exist already who share intellectual Ž property within their area of interest at 3M they exist as The Technical Forum, . Technical Special Interest Groups, and others . However, the focus of these groups is to maintain their technical skills and grow their knowledge. There is no group at the corporate level that brings people, knowledge and concepts together to pursue business opportunities with capital creation potential. The typical technology transfer model for a large corporation, drawing on the experience at 3M, is depicted below. Notice how the model is linear and one-dimensional for each division.
This model, by its nature, erects obstacles to the technology transfer process. An example of interdivisional breakdown in technology transfer is the reality that a group in Division A cannot reliably be expected to have up-to-date understanding of programs and developments in Division D. Furthermore, intra-divisional groups do not have many opportunities to share technology and ideas. For example, even within the same division rarely do development teams involve the sales force. Thus, novel application of existing technologies that could be used in different products, programs, or developments across divisions may go unused. Also, when division support for a program ends, the program typically dies, even if it could have been a success in the market place. Additionally, the sequential nature of the new product introduction processes in business requires many levels of approvals, and therefore, consistent and aggressive selling of the program at each stage of approval. Smaller competitors do not deal with many of these technologies transfer obstacles. They cannot gamble their existence on such inertia.
Perhaps the Achilles' heel of the traditional corporate model is that middle to upper management is empowered with halting the innovation process. Many factors hamper the impartiality of making such decisions within divisions. Managers and executives may have pet projects, favorite technologies, personality conflicts or they may simply be out of touch with the market trend or the latest technologies. Besides, the creative process and the innovative spirit may sprout from any area in the organization, even from the removed sales force. The traditional corporate model does not exploit the potential of the total organization. A new model for the corporate technology transfer is needed, and a proposed approach is described in the next section.
A new model for technology transfer and accelerated innovation in a large company
In the development a new fastener technology, 3M began to experiment with a technology transfer unit dedicated to fastener-related projects. From the analysis of this process within 3M, the resulting technology transfer model for that project is depicted in Fig. 2 . This model, with the inclusion of a technology transfer group, is working better than the more one-dimensional linear approach. However, as seen by the model, isolation still exists between the groups to the left and right of the transfer unit. The development, prototyping, design, and redesign happen to the left of the model and the production, distribution, sales, and support for the products take place in areas to the right. Additionally, the transfer unit at this particular company is acting more as an interest group, with little power to push the technology through the development process and yield a successful new product introduction. That power still resides at the division level. Production financing, sales, and distribution are still the responsibility of the division organization. Full use of resources is still missing from this model. This model has a serial and sequential nature. We see levels of vertical and horizontal alignment. For every serial sequence of the technology transfer, one may interpret an added level of restricted technology flow. Although this model is certainly an improvement over the model depicted in Fig. 3 , after interactions with individuals in every level within it, its shortcomings emerged. Therefore, we propose a new topological arrangement: a circular technology model. of knowledge around the circle, and between the circle and the elements of the central disc. The central disc provides the context and the constraints for the orbiting activities that surround, and interact with, the innovation system.
Our proposed model, depicted in Fig. 4 , is topologically very similar to the one proposed by Padmore et al. We have a central disc surrounded by a circle of elements and the flows of information occur both around the circle along the diameter, and between the circle and the central disc along the rays. However, the composing elements and the dynamics of the model are starkly different, since our focus is on the internal organization of the firm. The technology transfer unit takes the place of the central disc, acting as a catalyst in the proliferation of innovation by facilitating the exchange of ideas, concepts, and commercialization practices. One of the main activities of the technology transfer unit is to act as a hub of information, monitoring activities and programs. Another is to empower development groups to proceed with the new product development or continuing research projects whether they have division, group, or individual interest. Yet another important activity of the technology transfer unit is to maintain active contact with groups outside the organization.
The model is erected on three communications networks. Two of these networks are purely for the exchange of technology information. The other is more serial and deals with the stages of a new product introduction. Let us study the model in more detail. As shown in the model legend, the technology transfer unit is part of a primary communications network that ensures a shared vision, frequent communication at all levels, and removes any group isolation. The technology transfer unit, however, is not in the way of, but may aid and facilitate a secondary communications network that allows technology transfer among all groups within and outside the organization. Both of these communications channels are perpetually active.
The transfer between adjacent groups in the model depicts the activities more typical of the new product introduction process, for example, the iterative nature of design-test-Ž . ing-redesign, already presented in the interactive model of Kline and Rosenberg 1986 described in Section 2.
For divisions, the technology transfer unit could help strategize, position, and commercialize a product. The office could also establish key contacts, provide a ( )futuristic vision, involve production, distribution, customers, government agencies, etc., early and then continuously in the product development effort. Just as important, the technology transfer unit can help determine projects that should be halted or need reorientation. The assessment skills of individuals in the technical transfer office could help to appraise, support, promote, and develop technologies from individuals and groups who cannot win division support.
At the corporate level, the technology transfer unit could take responsibility for maintaining a comprehensive intellectual property portfolio. The office could actively pursue the commercial potential of the portfolio, including realizing licensing agreements with groups outside the company. This kind of revenue still goes unrealized by many large and innovative corporations, including 3M. The licensing activity could in turn make the technology transfer unit more aware of the intellectual property worth of the company, and may give it a sense for the opportunities within the company that deserve more research support. In addition, a truer assessment of the intangible worth of the company can be realized.
Yet another corporate activity of the technology transfer unit could be to assess and determine acquisition opportunities. Since the technology transfer unit will have a vast pool of experience and knowledge dealing with intellectual property and intellectual capital, the office would be most qualified and positioned to lead and realize acquisitions to the mutual benefit of the corporation and the acquired group. The corporation could, through the technology transfer unit, become more aware of business areas in strategic markets where a competitive weakness exists. Then, if the opportunities to grow and expand through acquisitions in those areas arise, the corporation could look to the technology transfer unit for an assessment of the business opportunity, business plan, and for leadership in negotiations.
Let us explore how a single group operating with this philosophy during two technology transfer activities in concert, a new product introduction and continuing support of an existing product, would operate in practice.
In a business unit involved in both development and support of a product, a representative sample list of relevant issues that the group would have to understand: Ø technical developments in technology area; Ø marketing developments in market; Ø issues with supporting groups; Ø issues with dependent groups; Ø market target for new product; Ø development schedule; Ø competitor's weaknesses, strengths and strategies; Ø position of existing and emerging product offering to corporate strategy.
Understanding these and scores of other issues would contribute to the efficiency, effectiveness, and competitiveness of groups and organizations. Fig. 5 , which makes more clear the technology transfer channels at each of the elements in the circle around the central disc, is a detail of a particular group's interactions in the circular model. In the model, the development technology transfer conduit ensures the interaction and communication between adjacent groups. However, groups that are removed and are not depicted above could communicate through the technology transfer unit or among themselves via the secondary communications channel.
Incorporating a process or requirement within the new product introduction methodology to involve the technology transfer unit could ensure the primary technology transfer conduit. Additionally, as part of its charter, the technology transfer unit would seek out an up to date understanding of group activities with the role of an observer or consultant.
For the group analyzed above, the communication with adjacent groups would go on as normally practiced currently. The communication with the technology transfer unit may be by scheduled update meetings, through records of invention, test reports, patent applications and other pertinent technical communication forwarded to the Technical Transfer Office, and through copy of program level communication.
Communication via the secondary technology transfer channel would be by means currently practiced augmented with an influx of publications, associations, and other means erected or suggested by the technology transfer unit. 
Conclusions
Group isolation within large diverse and global companies represents an obstacle to effective transfer and commercialization of technologies. Incorporating a new technology transfer process that facilitates communication, understanding, and vision sharing, while maximizing use of resources in the organization may reduce the effects of isolation and bureaucracy.
The most recent models of innovation and technology transfer emphasize the importance of communication and integration of functions and activities. The proposed technology transfer model offers the best attributes of these models, and tailors those dynamics to intra-company application.
While corporations fully understand the capital potential of their intellectual property, few actually dedicate a group, such as the technology transfer unit, to safeguard, commercialize, and manage the intellectual property within the organization. The technology transfer unit can be instrumental in achieving the best exploitation of the intellectual property potential, and with its skills set, it can direct or advice acquisition and licensing efforts.
